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Growth in the Scottish economy appears to 
be weakening again after some survey 
evidence of a pickup in the first quarter of the 
year. GDP fell slightly in the final quarter of 
last year and could fall again in the first 
quarter, despite survey evidence, if the 
Scottish economy continues to track the UK. 
The recovery from the Great Recession of 
2008 - 2009 remains weak with Scottish 
GDP still just under 4% below its pre- 
recession peak and employment 3% below. 
The UK figures are -4.3% and -1%. The 
recovery of Scottish GDP relative to the UK 
is also being overstated by the effect of 
falling oil and gas production. When oil and 
gas production is removed from the data the 
Scottish recovery is relatively weaker than 
previously thought with UK ex oil and gas 
GDP -3.5% below its pre-recession peak 
while the Scottish figure is -3.6%. 
 
It is now clear that the recovery in output 
stalled after mid-2010. We are strongly of the 
belief that the UK government fiscal austerity 
programme is the main culprit, with the 
added effects of the impact on business 
confidence of the developing problems in the 
Eurozone and the impact of rising commodity 
price driven inflation on real incomes and 
consumption. 
 
Considerable slack remains in the Scottish 
labour market, although the main indicators 
of unemployment, activity and employment 
rates have moved into line with the UK. 
However, it should be remembered that at 
the start of the Great Recession the Scottish 
unemployment rate was well below the UK 
rate at 3.9% compared to 5.5%. Jobs appear 
to be being created again but it is clear from 
the data to September 2011 that full-time 
jobs are falling while part-time and temporary 
jobs are rising. This is significant, because it 
is not impossible that labour demand has 
fallen with GDP even though the number of 
jobs rose recently and unemployment fell. 
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This would be the case if the loss of labour 
input through the fall in full-time employment 
was greater than the gain in labour services 
from the rise in part-time employment. 
 
Growth is clearly weakening again as both 
domestic and external demand growth 
falters. Household income growth is sluggish, 
with wage growth falling below 2% in the UK 
in the first quarter. Investment spending 
picked up at the end of last year but appears 
to be weaker in Scotland than the UK. 
Despite the positive contribution of net trade 
to growth in 2011, manufacturing export 
performance in Scotland faltered in the final 
quarter with zero growth but volume was up 
by 4.8% over the year. Manufacturing export 
volumes are still nearly 6% below their pre- 
recession peak. 
 
Fiscal consolidation continues to bite and 
there is much more to come with only 12% of 
planned total spending cuts completed by the 
end of financial year 2011-12 but with large 
reductions already made in capital spending. 
The inflation rate is falling back more slowly 
than the Bank of England expected due to 
the effects of high energy prices, and the 
Eurozone crisis is worsening again. The 
monetary policy regime is permissive but 
even with £325 billion of quantitative easing 
the leverage on the real economy is limited 
because the economy continues at an 
effective zero interest bound in a liquidity 
trap. It remains to be seen whether the Bank 
and the Chancellor's new "funding for 
lending" scheme, announced on 14 June, 
with up to £100 billion to cut bank funding 
costs in exchange for lending commitments 
will work to any significant extent in raising 
aggregate demand in the economy. We 
doubt it. It is against this background that we 
have produced our forecasts for 2012, 2013 
and 2014. 
 
We have made minimal changes to our GDP 
forecast for three years. Annual growth is 
expected to remain weak but positive this 
year at 0.4%, rising to 1.6% in 2013 and 
2.5% in 2014. Net jobs will continue to fall 
this year by around 15,000 but will turn 
positive in 2013 with an additional 20,000 
jobs forecast, rising to 36,000 in 2014. 
Unemployment, on the ILO measure, will rise 
to 246,000 by the year end, rising further to 
252,000 by end 2013 but thereafter it should 
fall reaching 238,000 by the close of 2014. 
 
The situation in the Eurozone complicates the 
forecasting picture considerably. We assume 
in our central forecast that for the medium 
term there is an essential "muddling through" 
process, with further support given first to 
peripheral country banking systems and then 
to their sovereigns if necessary. Through this 
process confidence remains low and growth 
is weak as austerity policies are not, or are 
insufficiently, relaxed. Moreover, complete 
steps to full fiscal union with Eurobonds and 
sizable fiscal transfers between countries, 
which would finally 
resolve the crisis, seem unlikely. 
 
But there remains the risk of a Greek default 
and even exit from the Euro in the near term 
and the break-up of the Euro in the medium 
term. We have therefore considered these 
two outcomes as possible scenarios to 
assess their likely impact on the Scottish 
economy. This is therefore not a forecast but 
a 'what-if' impact study, with the impact on 
the Scottish economy assessed at the end of 
three years after each event occurs. 
 
Our main conclusions are: First, a Greek exit 
leads to a drop in GDP in Scotland of -1.2% 
and a loss of just under fifty thousand jobs. 
This is not trivial but small compared to the 
other events show. Secondly, the 
consequences of the breakup of the Euro 
would be a major economic event for 
Scotland even though we are not in the Euro. 
With an estimated drop in GDP of -5.3% and 
loss of -144,200 jobs the effect would be 
comparable in scale to the effects of the 
recent Great Recession and worse than our 
simulation estimate of the effect of fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
Official data for the final quarter of last year show that 
growth in the Scottish economy turned negative again, 
although less so than in the UK. GDP contracted by 0.1% in 
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Figure 1:  Scottish and UK quarterly GDP growth, 1998q2 to 2011q4 
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Figure 2: GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2011q4 (Relative to pre-recession peak) 
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the fourth quarter compared to - 0.3% in the UK - see Figure 
1. But over the year, GDP grew by less in Scotland, 0.5%, 
than in the UK 0.6%. 
 
Overall Scottish GDP continues broadly to track the UK 
economy, which as we noted in the previous Commentary 
has been a feature of the "recovery" from the Great 
Recession of 2008 to 2009. Figure 2 shows the nature of 
that recovery in both the UK and Scotland. 
 
By the end of the fourth quarter last year Scottish GVA 
stood at -3.8% below the pre-recession peak three and a 
half years ago. In contrast, the figure for UK GVA is -4.3%. 
However, while the depth of the recession was greater in 
the UK, at -7.2%, than in Scotland, -5.8%, the recovery of 
UK GDP has been somewhat faster than in Scotland. 
 
Subtle changes to this picture are evident once we remove 
oil and gas from the GDP data. The Centre for Public Policy 
for Regions (CPPR) produced
1 
at the end of April an 
important analysis of UK and Scottish GDP growth in 2011. 
A key finding of the CPPR analysis is that a comparison of 
overall GVA between Scotland and the UK in 2011 provides 
a distorted comparison of the relative performance. This is 
because overall GVA includes all of North Sea Oil and Gas 
production in the UK figure but only includes on-shore 
activities in the Scottish figure. A more correct comparison is 
to compare GVA for the two excluding the extraction of oil 
and gas. 
 
Normally this matters little if the performance of oil and gas 
is not much out of line with overall performance. But during 
the past year oil and gas production fell by 18% and 22% 
respectively, which has affected UK GDP and export 
performance. The effect of this fall is to dampen UK growth 
relative to Scotland. 
 
In 2011, overall GVA grew by 0.5% in Scotland and 0.6% in 
the UK. But when oil and gas extraction is excluded the 
unfavourable gap between Scotland and the UK widens, 
with Scottish growth of 0.5% and UK growth of 1%. 
 
We have taken CPPR's analysis further and extend the 
comparison back to the start of the recession and 
subsequent recovery. The analysis is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: GVA ex oil & gas extraction, recession and recovery to 2011Q4 
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Figure 3 reveals that when overall GVA is considered UK 
growth is more damped recently relative to Scotland, 
compared to the position when oil and gas extraction is 
excluded where the UK recovery is relatively stronger. The 
main conclusion from this analysis is that the Scotland's 
recovery from recession has been weaker relative to the UK 
than previously believed. 
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Figure 4: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q4 
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Figure 5: Services GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2011q4 
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Figure 4: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q4 
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Figure 6: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2011q4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.0 
 
3.0 
Scotland 
UK 
 
2.0 
 
1.0 
 
0.0 
 
-1.0 
 
-2.0 
 
-3.0 
 
-4.0 
 
-5.0 
 
-6.0 
 
-7.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Manufacturing GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2011q4 
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Figure 8:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2011q4 
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The Scottish service sector, which accounts for 73% of 
GDP, grew by 0.2% in the fourth quarter, compared to a fall 
of -0.1% in UK services - see Figure 4. 
 
But UK services sector grew by 1.6% over the year while 
Scottish services could only muster growth of 0.4%. This 
underlying weakness of the recovery in Scottish services is 
highlighted in Figure 5. 
 
Scottish services GVA was still -2.9% below its pre- 
recession peak compared to -1.7% in the UK. Given that the 
loss of Scottish service sector output in the recession was 
-4.6% quite a bit less than the -5.4% output loss in services 
in the UK, we can see that there has been little recovery in 
Scottish services since the trough of the recession. In 
numbers, the recovery from the trough amounts to 1.8% in 
Scotland compared to 3.9% in UK services. 
In manufacturing, GVA contracted by -0.6% in Scotland 
compared to a marginally greater fall of -0.7% in the UK. 
 
Growth over the year was also stronger in Scottish 
manufacturing with GVA rising by 3% compared to 2% in 
the UK - see Figure 6. It is quite clear from Figure 6 that the 
recovery in UK manufacturing stalled after the second 
quarter 2010. The same cannot be said for Scottish 
manufacturing which while weakening after the summer of 
2010 has exhibited a more variable patter than its UK 
counterpart. Figure 7 charts the recession and recovery for 
both UK and Scottish manufacturing. 
As with services the loss of manufacturing output in 
recession was less than in the UK, but the recovery was 
initially weaker in Scotland but then strengthened relative to 
the UK after 2010. GVA in manufacturing in the recession 
dropped by -10.4% in Scotland compared to -13.4% in the 
UK. In the most recent quarter manufacturing GVA in 
Scotland stood at -5.9% below its pre-recession peak 
compared to -8.3% in the UK. A driver of the recovery in 
manufacturing is exports, which appears to have faltered in 
2011. (See more on drivers of recovery below.) 
The construction sector is going through a very difficult time 
in both Scotland and the UK. Figure 8 charts the recent 
growth performance. 
 
Construction output has been much weaker in Scotland for 
the last four quarters. In the fourth quarter GVA fell by -2.7% 
compared to a fall of -0.2% in the UK. Scottish construction 
growth was weaker over the year too with output falling by 
-1.5% compared to a rise of 2.8% in the UK. Figure 9 shows 
the performance of GVA in construction in Scotland and UK 
during the recession and recovery. 
 
The drop in output in the recession was large and identical 
in Scotland and the UK at -18.3%. Scottish construction 
bounced back more strongly than its UK counterpart, until 
2010 quarter 3 and then has contracted for 5 successive 
quarters, while UK construction contracted for 2 quarters, 
grew for 2 quarters, then contracted in the latest quarter. 
The result was that by 2011q4, construction GVA in 
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Figure 8:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2011q4 
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Figure 10: Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery to 2011q4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101.00 
 
100.00 
 
99.00 
 
98.00 
 
97.00 
 
96.00 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.0% 
 
Business & Financial 
Services Scotland 
 
Business & Financial 
Services UK 
 
95.00 
 
94.00 
 
93.00 
 
 
-6.9% -6.1% 
 
92.00 
 
91.00 
 
90.00 
 
89.00 
 
-9.7% 
 
88.00 
 
87.00 
 
86.00 
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY  
Vol.36 No.1, pp.4-23 
 
 
Scotland was -10.8% below its pre-recession peak while UK 
construction was -7.6% below its peak. A further large fall in 
UK construction output of -4.8% was recorded in the first 
quarter of this year. This was the largest decrease in 
construction output for 12 quarters and cannot be unrelated 
to fiscal consolidation where, so far, the bulk of the cuts 
have fallen on capital expenditure and buildings especially. 
 
Within services, the most important sector by contribution to 
GDP, business and financial services - 26% of overall GDP 
and 36% of service sector GVA - grew by 0.6% in Scotland 
but contracted by -0.1% in the UK during the fourth quarter 
of last year. Over the year, though, the sector grew by only 
0.3% in Scotland compared to much stronger growth of 
2.1% in the UK. Figure 10 shows the path of GVA in the 
sector during the recession and recovery relative to its pre- 
recession peak. 
 
As noted in the previous Commentary it is clear from the 
chart that this important sector experienced both a stronger 
recession in Scotland and a weaker recovery. GVA fell by 
-6.9% in UK business and financial services during the 
recession whereas in Scotland the contraction was -9.7%. 
By the latest quarter the sector in the UK was -3.0% below 
its pre-recession peak while its Scottish counterpart was 
-6.1% below, which is little different from the trough of the 
recession in the sector in the UK. Elsewhere in services 
Distribution, Hotels and Catering again grew more quickly in 
Scotland in both the recent quarter and over the year. 
Growth was 0.2% in the quarter compared to -0.4% in the 
UK, while over the year the Scottish sector grew by 3% 
while its UK counterpart grew by 0.7%. In contrast, as in the 
third quarter both Transport, Storage, Information & 
Communication and Government & Other Services 
performed slightly better in the UK than in Scotland. The 
Transport et al sector contracted by -0.6% in the quarter 
while the sector in the UK contracted by -0.5%. Over the 
year, the sector contracted by -0.7% in Scotland while 
expanding by 1.3% in the UK. Similarly, in the government & 
other services sector growth was again flat in the quarter but 
was positive at 0.4% in the UK. Over the year, public sector 
output fell in Scotland by -0.6% but exhibited growth of 1.5% 
in the UK. 
 
Figure 11: Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2011q4 
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Within manufacturing, we again only have data for Scottish 
sectors. The main sectors driving manufacturing growth of 
-0.6% in the fourth quarter were Engineering & Allied and 
Other manufacturing and repairs, with growth of 1.9% and 
0.2%, respectively. The Metals sector contracted by -3.5% 
during the quarter, while chemicals and refined petroleum 
contracted by -2.2%, food & drink contracted by -1.4% and 
output in textiles & clothing fell by -0.9%. Yet, again most of 
the main manufacturing sectors grew quite strongly over the 
year. Let us hope the downturn in the latest quarter proves 
to be temporary, although as we note below the most recent 
UK outturn and Scottish survey evidence does not offer 
much hope for that. 
 
Figure 11 charts the growth of key Scottish sectors over the 
last 14 years. 
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Figure 13: Expenditure component contributions to nominal Scottish GDP growth – percentage points 
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Figure 14: Scottish and UK jobs, 16 and over, compared to pre-recession peak 
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Figure 15: Scottish Employment to Working Population ratio compared to pre-recession peak in April-June 
2007 to Jan-Mar 2012 
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In the past we have included electronics on this chart. 
However, the scale of the changes in electronics over the 
period from rapid growth in the late 1990s to collapse in the 
early 2000's and then continuing decline, compresses the 
performance of the other sectors when included on the 
same chart. What is now clear is that the contribution of 
electronics directly to GDP is quite small. In 2007, the 
contribution to overall GVA amounted to 1.6% and only 13% 
to manufacturing GVA. Back in 2000 the sector contributed 
more than 6% to GVA. Chemicals which is included in 
Figure 11 makes a similar current contribution to GVA. 
What Figure 11 reveals is the change in sectoral fortunes 
over the decade. The strong growth of financial services, 
decline in the recession and limited recovery is evident. 
Transport & Communication and Real Estate and Business 
Services are two other sectors that grew strongly before the 
recession and then were badly affected by it. But, in 
contrast, the Food & Drink sector experienced a fairly weak 
downturn during the recession and continued to grow 
strongly thereafter. Retail & wholesale also picked up 
quickly. The remaining sectors shown, with one exception, 
have yet to recover from recession and remain well below 
their pre-recession peak. The exception is the public sector, 
which grew steadily over the period with recent stagnation 
but fiscal consolidation has not resulted in a systematic 
contraction yet. 
 
Drivers of Recovery 
The weak recovery of Scottish GDP begs the question what 
the drivers of recovery are and what they might be. 
It is quite clear that the Scottish and UK economies were 
beginning to recover from the recession by mid-2010. But 
after that the recovery faltered as Figure 12 shows. 
 
So what is the explanation of the stalled recovery? 
 
We are strongly of the belief that the UK government fiscal 
austerity programme is the main culprit, with the added 
effects of the impact on business confidence of the 
developing problems in the Eurozone and the impact of 
rising commodity price driven inflation on real incomes and 
consumption. 
 
From the Scottish Government's National Accounts 
Programme (SNAP) web pages, we can calculate the 
change in the contribution of the main expenditure 
components to Scottish nominal GDP growth in 2010 and 
2011. This is an experimental dataset so it must be used 
with caution. 
 
In 2010, Scottish GDP at current prices - nominal GDP - 
grew by 5.4%. In 2011 the growth rate dropped to 4.7%. 
Figure 13 breaks down the nominal growth into the main 
spending components in the two years. 
 
What is clear from these data is that there was a switch in 
growth away from domestic spending to net trade as the UK 
government had hoped. However, that wasn't sufficient to 
offset the absolute fall in government and investment 
spending and the slowdown in private consumption growth. 
There was a 1.7 percentage point switch in favour of net 
trade against falls of 1.3 percentage points in private 
consumption, 0.7 percentage points in government 
expenditure and 0.3 percentage points in investment. This 
doesn't prove that austerity was the cause but it looks 
suspiciously so. 
 
It is highly probable that the rise in VAT lowered private 
consumption, which in turn led to less investment. 
Moreover, lower government spending also will itself have 
affected investment in buildings and plant and equipment. 
That said we should not forget that real incomes of 
households fell as inflation rose and that may have affected 
consumption too. But if the Scottish economy is to recover 
in the face of continuing fiscal austerity it is difficult to 
envisage much improvement in the other expenditure 
components under present conditions of continuing Euro 
crisis, weak real income growth, a flat housing market, and 
weak demand conditions in the main OECD economies. A 
further fall in the inflation rate may affect consumption 
favourably as real incomes rise, or fall by less. But as we 
noted in earlier Commentaries if households are striving to 
reduce their debt levels then a rise in real income may be 
used to pay down debt further rather than encourage more 
spending. 
 
The Labour Market 
The Scottish labour market data for the quarter January to 
March provide evidence of an improvement. Unemployment 
fell by 10,000 over the quarter to 220,864, as employment 
rose by 24,000, to 2,482,164. The Scottish unemployment 
rate moved into line with the UK rate of 8.2% and the 
employment rate, at 71.2%, stayed above the UK rate of 
70.5% for the 16-64 age group. For all aged 16 and over, 
the employment rate in Scotland moved from slightly below 
the UK rate to parity at 58%. But within these numbers male 
employment is rising (+29k) while female employment is 
falling (-5k). 
 
The employment position of Scotland compared to the UK 
during recession and recovery to the latest data point is 
indicated in Figure 14. 
 
Even with the recent one-quarter rise in employment the 
level of jobs in Scotland is still 3% below the pre-recession 
peak. UK employment, in contrast, stands at 1% below its 
pre-recession peak. Moreover, as we have noted before in 
this Commentary the jobs position is worse than the bald 
employment figures suggest because the working 
population and hence labour supply is growing. Figure 15 
provides data on the ratio of employment to working 
population. What this chart shows is that even with the 
recent rise in jobs the ratio is 5.5% below the pre-recession 
peak. That is only a little above the situation at the trough of 
the recession when the ratio fell to 6.4% below the pre- 
recession peak. The implication of this statistic is that there 
are significant unused labour reserves in the Scottish labour 
market and, in relation to the available labour supply, the 
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Figure 16: Scotland's Recession and Recovery by Type of Employment 
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Figure 17: Shares of Total Employment by Type 
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recovery of employment has been exceptionally weak. But 
that is generally the case across the UK, so that despite 
the weaker jobs recovery in Scotland, unemployment is 
equal to the UK rate and is the 6th lowest amongst the 13 
UK regions and territories. It should also be remembered 
that Scotland started the recession with an unemployment 
rate below the UK - at 3.9% compared with 5.5% - hence 
the greater relative jobs loss has caused the 
unemployment rate and other main labour market 
indicators to move into line with the UK. 
 
At first sight the recent jobs data from the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) appear to conflict with what we know about 
the real economy. GDP fell in the UK in successive 
quarters to the first quarter and fell in Scotland in the final 
quarter of last year. We will not know what has happened 
to Scottish GDP in the first quarter until mid July. However, 
some analysts believe that the ONS is underestimating 
recent GDP growth, while others contend that we are 
slipping into a sustained recession again. So, there is no 
guarantee that unemployment will continue to fall. Indeed, 
it could worsen again. 
 
Our estimates suggest that there needs to be Scottish GDP 
growth of 2% per year - approximately 0.5% per quarter - 
for unemployment to stabilise. Faster growth for it to fall 
and with slower GDP growth, the unemployment rate will 
rise. The economy seems to be quite a bit below the 2% 
per annum threshold at the moment. 
 
Another reason for caution about these LFS data is the 
high sampling variability. There is a huge range within 
which one can have 95% confidence that the Scottish LFS 
estimates fall.  So, while the LFS estimates that jobs rose 
by 24,000 in January to March, the actual change could 
have - with 95% certainty - been between minus 34,000 
and plus 83,000. For unemployment, the LFS estimate is a 
10,000 fall but the actual change in unemployment might 
have been anywhere between a fall of 42,000 and a rise of 
22,000. A similar range of variation applies to the change in 
the numbers economically active and inactive. 
 
Finally, we should be concerned that the data as currently 
released do not allow us to drill down and ask how the 24k 
jobs change is broken down into part-time jobs and full- 
time jobs, or hours worked. Nor do we know the age 
composition of the recent unemployment change. Yes, we 
are given data in the latest release on part-time and full- 
time jobs, hours worked and the age distribution of 
employment and unemployment. But these data are only 
provided up to the year Oct 2010 - September 2011. So, 
we just don't know what's happening recently. 
 
It is clear from the data to September 2011 that full-time 
jobs are falling while part-time and temporary jobs are 
rising. This is significant, because it is not impossible that 
labour demand has fallen with GDP even though the 
number of jobs rose recently and unemployment fell. This 
would be the case if the loss of labour input through the fall 
in full-time employment was greater than the gain in labour 
services from the rise in part-time employment. It is a 
possibility. Figure 16 shows the differential behaviour of 
types of employment in recession and recovery. Part-time 
and temporary employment dipped briefly but then picked 
up quickly less than a year after the recession began. Full- 
time employment continued to fall throughout the period, 
while self employment returned to its pre-recession peak in 
mid-2010 and continued to rise thereafter. 
 
The rising share of part-time and falling share of full-time in 
total employment is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
Forecasts 
 
Background 
Real GDP in the UK economy contracted further by 0.3% in 
the first three months of this year. With UK GDP also 
estimated to have fallen by 0.3% in the final quarter of last 
year the latest quarterly data place the UK firmly in 
recession. The decline in first quarter real GDP was 
principally affected by a 4.8% fall in construction output and 
a further contraction in oil and gas production. On the 
expenditure front in the first quarter, growth was largely 
driven by government consumption and a slight pickup in 
household spending. Net trade contributed negatively to 
growth as exports remained flat and imports picked up 
slightly. The fall in inventories, or stock building, was the 
main expenditure driver of negative growth, which does not 
augur well for production in later quarters. 
Survey evidence for the first quarter in the UK appears to 
conflict with the UK GDP data as produced by ONS. The 
biggest difference is in the performance of construction, 
where the PMI indicates that growth was much stronger 
and indeed positive. The PMI also suggests that service 
sector growth was considerably stronger than the 0.1% 
outturn in the ONS data. But after March the PMI surveys 
indicate that the UK economy was slowing down in April 
and then again in May. A weakening in the growth of 
demand both domestically and from abroad, especially the 
Eurozone where growth is clearly slowing, with a slowdown 
evident in emergent markets as well.  On the domestic 
front households are reporting concerns about their 
finances. Firms report weak demand for goods and 
services and export orders have been particularly hit. 
Markit, who produce the PMI surveys, suggest that UK 
growth should be weak but still positive in the second 
quarter to June. 
 
The Scottish economy contracted in the final quarter of last 
year but at -0.1% the contraction was marginally less than 
the fall in UK GDP. First quarter Scottish GDP/GVA data 
are not available until the third week in July, so we must 
rely on business survey evidence. The Scottish Chambers' 
Business Survey (SCBS) revealed that the trends in all 
sectors in the first quarter were better than a year ago. 
There were more signs of a modest but uncertain recovery 
in 2012 as demand in the Scottish economy remained 
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Figure 18: Bank of Scotland PMI Private Sector Index: Scotland and UK October 2011 – May 2012 
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weak. The Bank of Scotland PMI of private sector activity in 
Scotland noted that the private sector lost momentum in 
both April and then especially in May after picking up in the 
first quarter. Figure 18 charts the Scottish position 
compared to the UK. 
 
In May growth was just positive according to the PMI but 
was weaker than in the UK. 
 
So, the evidence is that growth is clearly weakening again 
as both domestic and external demand growth falters. 
Household income growth is sluggish, with wage growth 
falling below 2% in the UK in the first quarter. Investment 
spending picked up at the end of last year in both Scotland 
and the UK but remains below the pre-recession peak in 
both jurisdictions and appears from the SNAP data to be 
weaker in Scotland than the UK. Despite the positive 
contribution of net trade to growth in 2011 manufacturing 
export performance in Scotland faltered in the final quarter 
with zero growth but volume was up by 4.8% over the year. 
Manufacturing export volumes are still nearly 6% below 
their pre-recession peak. Fiscal consolidation continues to 
bite and there is much more to come with only 12% of 
planned total spending cuts completed by the end of 
financial year 2011-12 but with large reductions already 
made in capital spending. The inflation rate is falling back 
more slowly than the Bank of England expected due to the 
effects of high energy prices, and the Eurozone crisis is 
worsening again. The monetary policy regime is permissive 
but even with £325 billion of quantitative easing the 
leverage on the real economy is limited because the 
economy continues at an effective zero interest bound in a 
liquidity trap.  It remains to be seen whether the Bank and 
the Chancellor's new "funding for lending" scheme, 
announced on 14 June, with up to £100 billion to cut bank 
funding costs in exchange for lending commitments will 
work to any significant extent in raising aggregate demand 
in the economy. We doubt it. It is against this background 
that we have produced our forecasts for 2012, 2013 and 
2014. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational 
procedure adopted in the previous Commentary. We 
present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast 
errors to establish the likely range that the true first 
estimate of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between. In 
this forecast, we extend the forecast horizon to include 
2014 
 
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2012 to 2014. The forecasts are 
presented in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish 
Economy section of this Commentary below. 
 
Table 1 shows that we have made minimal changes to our 
forecast for three years. For 2012, we saw no reason to 
change out February forecast, which is for very weak but 
still positive growth and similar to the rate of growth seen 
through 2011. The increase in output measured for the 
third quarter of 2011 was stronger than we expected (a 
0.5% increase), and broadly tracked the UK growth in that 
quarter. As we noted in February, our forecast of 0.4% for 
2012 is not inconsistent with one, or possibly two, quarters 
of negative growth through 2012. In February, we forecast 
growth in 2013 of 1.7%, so our latest forecast is revised 
down slightly reflecting continuing weakness in both 
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domestic and external demand. Our forecast for 2014 is 
also reduced slightly for the same reasons. 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2012- 
2014 
 
GVA Growth (% per 
annum) 2012 2013 2014 
 
Central forecast 0.4 1.5 2.5 
sheds a further  2,100 jobs. Through 2013 and 2014 we 
forecast increases in employee jobs in our central forecast, 
with annual increases of around 20 thousand and 36 
thousand respectively. There are job increases across all 
the main sectors, with a majority being created in the 
service sector. However, we continue to forecast a 
“rebalancing” of employment within the services sectors 
towards non-public activities as fiscal consolidation 
continues. Construction employment is forecast to increase 
in 2013 and 2014 as spending on (private) investment 
November forecast 
 
UK median independent 
new (May) 
 
 
 
0.4 
0.4 
 
 
 
1.7 
1.7 
 
 
 
2.2 
2.6 projects eventually returns with renewed confidence in the 
recovery. 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in 
Three Scenarios, 2012-2014 
Mean Absolute Error % 
points 
+/- 0.495 +/- 1.06 +/- 1.216  
2012 2013 2014 
Upper -5,200 41,000 61,750 
February forecast -4,816 47,244 63,745 
Table 1, also compares our GVA forecasts with the median 
of latest independent  forecasts for the UK in, 2012 and 
2013 and the average of the new independent medium- 
term forecasts for 2014 that are published by the UK 
Treasury. These show that we expect Scottish growth to 
continue to be much the same as UK growth: identical this 
year, a little weaker next year and a little stronger in 2014. 
So, we are now forecasting growth of 0.4% in 2012, 1.5% 
in 2013, and 2.5% in 2014. Given our previous forecast 
errors the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2012 are 
expected to be -0.1% and 0.9%, for 2013, 0.5% and 2.7%, 
and for 2014 1.3% to 3.7%. 
 
Production and manufacturing output are again projected 
to be the main sectoral drivers of growth, with Production 
forecast to grow by 1% this year compared to service 
sector and construction growth of 0.3% which are largely 
flat-lining. In 2013, production continues to be the main 
sectoral driver of growth with growth of 3.6%. Stronger 
growth is projected for services and construction of 1% 
apiece but the two sectors will still be recovering slowly. It 
is not until 2014 that we see much pick-up in growth. GDP 
is forecast to rise by 2.5%, while production growth rises 
appreciably to 5.7%, service sector growth moves up to 
1.7% and the growth of construction GVA reaches 1.6%. 
 
Employment Forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for 
the 3 years 2012 to 2014 in terms of a central and upper 
and lower forecasts. 
 
Table 2 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
are similar to those presented in the February 
Commentary. On the central forecast, net jobs grow by 
-0.7% in 2012, 0.9% in 2013, and by 1.6% in 2014. The 
number of employee jobs in Scotland is forecast to decline 
during 2012 by just less than 15,000 jobs. Within the 
sectors, however, we are forecasting a reduction in jobs in 
the service sectors of under sixteen thousand jobs. The 
production sector adds 2,400 jobs, while construction 
 
Central -14,950 19,950 36,050 
February forecast -15,988 23,213 38,023 
 
Lower -25,350 -1,700 10,450 
February forecast -27,695 -9,250 12,126 
 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
3 below. 
 
Table 3: ILO unemployment rate and claimant 
count rate measures of unemployment under 
each of the three forecast scenarios 2012-2014 
 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 
ILO unemployment 
 
Rate (ILO un/TEA 
16+) 9.3% 9.5% 9.0% 
Numbers 246,100 252,400 238,200 
 
Claimant count 
 
Rate (CC/CC+total 
job)  5.7% 6.5% 6.1% 
Numbers  152,550 176,700  169,100 
 
 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for 
work, whereas the claimant count simply records the 
unemployed who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. 
We have revised down our forecasts for unemployment at 
the end of 2012. In part this is due to revisions in the 
employee jobs series affecting our forecasts for the level of 
employment at the end of 2011 and impacting on the 
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future. We are also mindful that the claimant count has 
risen more slowly than ILO unemployment since the start of 
the great recession in 2008. Our forecasts for 
unemployment in 2013 are broadly unchanged from those 
made in February (although the ILO rate forecast has 
increased slightly from 9.3% to 9.5% at the end of 2013), 
while our forecasts for 2014 are largely in line with our 
earlier forecasts. Our forecast for unemployment on the 
ILO measure at the end of 2012 is now 246,100. We are 
expecting the unemployment position to deteriorate slightly 
in 2013 compared to 2012 due to weaker output and 
employment growth. Unemployment is now forecast to be 
252,400 by the end of that year. In 2014, unemployment 
falls to 238,200 as growth and job creation pick up during 
the year. 
 
Impact of Breakdown of the Eurozone The 
situation in the Eurozone has deteriorated again recently. 
As I write the yield on Spanish 10 year bonds has gone 
above 7%, making financing costs of government debt 
prohibitive or leading to a significant crowding out of 
key government expenditures. The Greek election will have 
taken place on Sunday after we have gone to press with 
the strong likelihood of a result which will put into 
government a party or parties that will refuse to accept the 
austerity programme that Germany and the other Eurozone 
countries are imposing upon it. There is therefore a strong 
likelihood of default and the value of Greek bonds will 
collapse. This will in turn affect Eurozone and other country 
banks that hold Greek debt. The balance sheet of Greek 
banks will contract and most Greek banks will become 
insolvent, lending will contract and many banks could fail. 
The default is likely to lead to a loss of Eurozone and IMF 
financing to Greece - about 180 billion Euros in loans - 
which in turn will generate a further contraction of public 
expenditure and loss of economic activity and jobs. 
In these circumstances, the new Greek Government would 
be likely to seek new loans but they probably would not be 
forthcoming given the default. If they can get new loans 
then it will be possible to re-capitalise the Greek banks and 
the financial system in Greece would survive and Greece 
could stay in the Euro or use it as a shadow currency. In 
the absence of such loans Greece would almost certainly 
leave the Euro. The government would have to find a 
means of funding its necessary expenditure and so would 
be likely to re-denominate all Greek bank deposits from 
Euros into a new Drachma thus introducing a new 
currency. This new currency would drop dramatically in 
value in relation to the euro and other currencies as soon 
as it was traded on the currency markets. Capital controls 
would have to be introduced. Inflation would take off and 
output would be likely to fall further. But in the longer term 
a new currency at a much lower exchange rate would 
restore the country's competitiveness and could help bring 
growth back to the economy. This is broadly what 
happened after Argentina broke its peg to the US dollar in 
December 2001. The problem for Greece is that its export 
reduction to choke off imports. 
 
Meanwhile, the default could start a process of contagion. 
Banks in other Eurozone countries as well as banks in 
other countries such as the UK and Scotland, would need 
to contract loans faced with some reduction in their balance 
sheet as debt is written off. In addition, the fact of a Greek 
default and exit from Euro would likely lead to a capital 
flight and selling of government bonds from other 
peripheral Eurozone countries as holders fear defaults in 
these countries, or loss of asset value if the country leaves 
the Eurozone and introduces its own devalued currency. 
Government bond yields would be rising in these countries 
making it difficult if not impossible to finance their deficit 
and debt position and so the attractiveness to governments 
of default and exit from the euro would rise. The capital 
flight leading to rising bond yields would in turn undermine 
the balance sheets of local banks as well as foreign banks 
holding peripheral country bonds. That would lead to 
cutbacks in bank lending and a likely credit crunch both 
within the affected countries and elsewhere. Output would 
begin to fall first in the peripheral countries and then even 
in the core countries such as Germany. This in turn would 
via trade and foreign investment flows impact on countries 
across the world. And at some point if other countries 
began to leave the euro, the euro currency area could 
break up. 
 
Of course this is only a possible process and not a forecast. 
The Eurozone has the European Financial Stability Fund 
(EFSF)and the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which may have sufficient funds to limit contagion from a 
Greek default and exit. But there again it may not. Our 
central forecast assumes that some compromise is made 
with Greece so that it neither fully defaults nor exits from 
the Euro. In addition, we assume that for the medium term 
there is an essential "muddling through" process, with 
further support given first to peripheral country banking 
systems and then to their sovereigns if necessary. Through 
this process confidence remains low and growth is weak as 
austerity policies are not, or are insufficiently, relaxed. 
Moreover, complete steps to full fiscal union with 
Eurobonds and sizable fiscal 
transfers between countries, which would finally resolve the 
crisis, seem unlikely. 
 
But there remains the risk of a Greek default and even exit 
from the Euro in the near term and the break-up of the 
Euro in the medium term. We have therefore considered 
these two outcomes as possible scenarios to assess their 
likely impact on the Scottish economy. This is therefore not 
a forecast but a 'what-if' impact study, with the impact on 
the Scottish economy assessed at the end of three years 
after each event occurs. We do not allow for any offsetting 
monetary and fiscal policy actions that could be introduced 
by the Bank of England and the UK government. In this we 
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Figure 19: Euro Breakdown, Impact Chan els and Scottish Impact 
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follow and draw upon the work of ING who have modelled 
the impact on GDP and jobs in major countries, but not 
Scotland, of these two events. Our analysis, modelling of 
the transmission mechanism and estimates of impact are 
discussed in greater detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish 
Economy section of this Commentary below. 
 
The impact of both a Greek default and euro exit and a 
complete break-up of the Euro would impact upon the 
Scottish economy through several different channels. 
These are shown in Figure 19. 
 
The figure suggests that the transmission mechanism 
embraces five main channels, through which GDP and jobs 
in the Scottish economy would be affected: 
 
• country GDP 
• consumer confidence 
• business confidence 
• bank lending 
• foreign direct investment. 
 
Changes in the GDP of Eurozone countries and other major 
economies in the wider global economy such as the US and 
the UK would affect Scottish GDP and jobs through 
a reduction in Scottish exports to such countries. Reduced 
consumer confidence would bear directly on household 
consumption in Scotland. Reduced business confidence 
would affect the willingness to export and invest. 
Reductions in lending from Scottish and UK banks as they 
sought to rebuild their balance sheets would be likely to 
affect all three sources of demand: exports, consumption 
and investment. A reduction in FDI flows from the 
Eurozone but also the US and elsewhere as their 
economies contract would clearly affect investment but 
also exports. Finally, as GDP and jobs began to fall directly 
as a result of these Euro events multiplier effects would 
kick in leading to further secondary falls in domestic 
Scottish consumption and investment and hence GDP and 
jobs. 
 
The results of this modelling exercise are presented first for 
GDP and then for jobs in Figures 20 and 21, respectively, 
below. 
 
It should again be stressed that these estimates are the 
result of a "what if" simulation with estimated impact after 3 
years with all other things held equal. One countervailing 
force could be any monetary and fiscal policy responses 
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Figure 20: Scottish GDP Impact of Euro Breakdown Compared to other Events 
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Figure 21: Scottish Jobs Impact of Euro Breakdown Compared to other Events 
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introduced by the Bank of 
England and the UK 
Government. 
 
If that caveat is kept in mind we can 
draw the following conclusions. First, a 
Greek exit leads to a drop in GDP in 
Scotland of -1.2% and a loss of just 
under fifty thousand jobs. This is not 
trivial but small compared to the other 
events show. Secondly, the 
consequences of the breakup of the 
Euro would be a major economic event 
for Scotland even though we are not in 
the Euro. With an estimated drop in GDP 
of -5.3% and loss of -144,200 jobs the 
effect would be comparable in scale to 
the effects of the recent 
Great Recession and worse than our 
simulation estimate of the effect of fiscal 
consolidation. Such an event only a few 
years after two major exogenous shocks 
to the Scottish economy - Great 
Recession and Fiscal Consolidation - is 
something that we must hope can be 
avoided. Because if it does occur, the 
damage to the Scottish economy will be 
felt for many years to come. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
15 June 2012 
 
 
 
 
1 
See http://www.cppr.ac.uk/media/media_231879_en.pdf 
 
